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Abstract 
Choice for patients, over varying aspects of health care, is becoming an 
increasingly common feature in European health care systems, especially in 
tax-funded health care systems. In this European ‘choice agenda’ we focus on 
the case of patients’ choice of health care provider.  Previous research draws 
on the expected quality and efficiency improvements as the main reform 
motivations. We put forward a political explanation, namely the satisfaction 
of the ‘middle class’ demand for health care use, who could alternative opt 
out to the private sector . To gather some evidence of the latter ewe explore 
the role and preferences of the middle class using survey data on a cross-
section of European countries. Our findings suggest that the middle class, in 
countries implementing choice reforms has a pronounced preference for the 
availability of choice as a component of a quality health care system. The 
political impetus to satisfy this preference is consistent with the ‘middle class’ 
demand hypothesis.     
 
Keywords: provider choice, health system satisfaction, tax funded health systems, 
middle class demands.  
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1. Introduction 
 
A key tenet of European health and consumer protection strategy lies in 
strengthening patient involvement in decision making (European Union 
2006). A dominant reform consistent with that goal is the furthering of 
patients’ and users’ choice of health care provider, such as hospital, clinic or 
general practitioner. The ‘choice agenda’ – the expansion of patient choice and 
individual responsibility – also extends to more detailed choices around 
specific treatments, inpatient, outpatient, treatment and choice of health care 
professional (Le Grand 2007). In general, the ‘choice agenda’ does not include 
choice in relation to the financing of care, such as options to purchase private 
insurance, except in some social health insurance type countries such as 
Germany and the Netherlands (Bartholomée & Maarse 2006, Lisac et al. 2010).  
 
The general benefits of individual choice are well documented (see Iyengar 
2010, Schwartz 2004).  However, for a patient to benefit from provider choice 
specifically, health systems need to widen service diversity – in essence to 
offer a ‘real’ choice. From a provider perspective this means dealing with 
some level of competition in the organization of public services. The standard 
economics explanation of the benefits of such reforms argues that the 
empowerment of patients and provider diversity rewards more efficient 
production and improved quality (Kreisz and Gericke 2010). Based on this 
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rationale, provider choice suggests the potential for efficiency-driven re-
organisation of the health care provision sector. Other benefits of choice 
include the potential to shift providers’ motivation to be more patient-
oriented and offer a personalised service, as well as to modernise technology 
and processes (Newman & Kuhlmann 2007).  
 
In European publicly-funded health care systems, choice and its associated 
benefits are seen to be one way of maintaining popular support for the health 
care system, which is frequently a highly salient issue in electoral politics 
(Oliver 2006). Offering choice is also argued to reduce the risk of patients 
‘exiting’ the system and opting for privately funded and provided services. 
For individuals with the economic capacity to supplement or substitute public 
care, the quality and accessibility of the public system has been found to 
constitute a key determinant of its continued use and support (Costa-Font and 
Jofre-Bonet 2008; Costa and Garcia, 2003).  
 
We here broadly conceptualise this ‘economically-able’ group as ‘middle 
class’, drawing on the well-established body of literature on the role of the 
middle class in driving the public policy agenda dating back to Goodin and 
Le Grand (1987). Blomqvist, discussing choice and privatisation in the case of 
Sweden, also places the middle class as both the key proponent and 
beneficiary of choice reforms across public services (2004). According to 
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sociologists, the middle class strives to ‘culturally’ distinguish itself from 
‘others’ (Bourdieu 2008) and choice in public services is one way to 
accomplish this. This is however in conflict with the goals stated by 
policymakers, who promote choice as a truly equitable way of organising 
pubic services because it is, in theory, available to all social groups, regardless 
of income or other characteristics (Milburn 2002).  Critics of the introduction 
of choice have also argued that it is nothing more than an insidious way of 
introducing an American-style private system which places a large burden of 
responsibility onto the individual. 
 
We argue in this paper that the motivation to appeal to the middle class is a 
key feature of the choice agenda, beyond the economic quality and efficiency 
arguments. Choice, in this sense, becomes part of the institutional toolkit that 
works to keep the middle class using and supporting the public health 
system. This is particularly relevant in National Health Service (NHS) systems 
where choice has traditionally been limited, relative to Social Health 
Insurance (SHI) systems where choice is traditionally institutionalised. We 
empirically explore this claim using cross-country survey data that captures 
public opinion in relation to health system characteristics in a set of European 
countries, including both NHS and SHI type health care systems (see table 1 
for an overview of the countries).  
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The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: the next section discusses 
the role of the middle class in relation to other motivations for choice reforms 
in European health care systems. Next, methods and descriptive data are 
outlined, followed by results of the empirical analysis in section four. Section 
five provides a discussion of the evidence provided and implications for 
theory and policy while section six concludes.  
 
2. The choice agenda in European health systems 
Choice has been widely incorporated into public services across Europe, but 
in starkly different ways. A range of motivations have been put forward for 
this trend, and concerns have been raised over the long-term trajectories and 
the equitability of such policies. This section outlines the drivers of choice 
reforms and places the role of the middle class within the literature, with 
particular attention to evidence related to the countries later used in the 
empirical analysis.  
 
Efficiency  
At its core, the choice agenda positions citizens as consumers in fictitious 
markets. However, compared to the free market, introducing provider choice 
and competition in health systems relies on a set of more complex 
mechanisms (Le Grand & Bartlett 1993). General taxation can be thought of as 
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an implicit (public) price, yet unlike in a market system, its returns are 
complex to establish.  A major challenge in identifying value is the capacity 
for judging health care quality, as shown in the United States where patients 
did not use information on quality of care to switch from hospitals with poor 
quality to those with high quality (Marshall et al. 2000). In a systematic review 
Fung et al (2008), came to a similar conclusion. In spite of this, a stream of 
studies on the English NHS have found evidence in favour of efficiency, 
quality and even wellbeing improvements following choice and competition 
in health care (Propper et al, 2008; Gaynor et al, 2010; Cooper et al. 2011, 
Zigante 2011). Similarly, evidence from Swedish hospitals suggests 
improvements in technical efficiency following the introduction of choice and 
competition (Gerdtham et al. 1999). Given this, it is conceivable that the 
incentives might operate through more complex mechanisms (Newman and 
Kuhlmann 2007, Frank and Lamiraud 2009 ).  
 
The rationale for the efficiency argument is that it facilitates cost-containment 
over time, acknowledging that these cost pressures will vary between 
countries (Steffen 2010). In NHS style countries such as the UK, reforms have 
included choice of GP and more recently choice of hospital for elective 
surgery accompanied by waves of internal market competition (Department 
of Health 2003) but overall budget expansion persists. In Italy and Spain, 
where health care is devolved and provider choice has become policy in 
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certain regions, soft budget constraints have stimulated experimentation but 
not cost-containment (Durán et al. 2006, Costa-Font 2012 and Costa-Font and 
Pons-Novell 2007). Only in Sweden with a decentralised financing and 
provision structure, is choice conducive to cost-containment (Fotaki 2007).  
Concerns over rising expenditure in part explains why in social insurance 
countries some policies have instead restricted provider choice and 
introduced gate-keeping aspects to improve the targeting of health care 
utilisation, for example in Germany and France (Or et al, 2010). 
 
Provider capture  
Following Hacker (2005), the choice agenda can be argued to result in provider 
capture, where a focus on profitability leads providers to increase their rents at 
the expense of the rest of the health system. There is much to gain from 
involvement in the health care sector for a variety of private firms, including 
local health care providers as well as the international pharmaceutical and 
insurance industry (Evans 1997).  
 
The countries in our sample show varying patterns of periods of contraction 
and expansion of private expenditure (OECD 2010). In both Sweden and the 
UK the emphasis on public provision has been maintained even though 
private providers are allowed to offer certain services paid for through the 
public system. In fact, Sweden as well as Belgium are the only countries 
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showing a steady increase in expenditure on privately provided services.  In 
Spain, certain regions such as Catalonia, where the majority of providers are 
privately run, have followed a purchaser-provider split quasi market model 
with some level of competition (López et al. 2006). Similarly, in Italy, it is 
mainly the Lombardy region that promotes competition between public and 
private hospitals. Here the policies have resulted in some quality 
improvements which has in turn brought in patients from other regions 
(France and Taroni 2005; France et al. 2005).  
 
Quality and responsiveness  
Several countries have moved towards choice and competition reforms with 
the aim of addressing shortcomings in the health care system. Examples of 
shortcomings include excessive waiting times, lack of patient centeredness 
and overly bureaucratic procedures. In Sweden, a number of efficiency-
enhancing choice policies have been introduced due to concerns about 
growing waiting times (Burström 2009). Similarly in the UK, the NHS has 
been subject to criticism for poorly addressing issues with access and 
excessive waiting times. This fed into the sequence of choice reforms; from 
initial choice policies in the late 1980s under Conservative governments, later 
followed by Labour’s ‘third way’ policies which again expanded choice and 
competition (Greener 2003). On the other hand, Italy’s scattered approach to 
choice and competition (mainly present in the northern region of Lombardy) 
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does not point towards quality and responsiveness pressures as drivers of 
reform (France and Taroni 2005). 
 
The role of the middle class   
The middle class arguably benefits disproportionately from universally-
provided services and benefits (Goodin and Le Grand 1987).  This is seen to 
be linked to their ability to navigate services more effectively, enabled by 
higher levels of education and better social standing (e.g. connections). Even 
though the usefulness of a class based welfare analysis in modern welfare 
states has be questioned (Pierson1996), Korpi and Palme emphasised how we 
should instead revive the role of class when explaining the welfare state 
(2003). Korpi and Palme conceptualise class as defined through “membership 
groups with which individuals identify and the specific subcultures and 
norms of such groups” (2003: 427). 
 
Several authors have highlighted the particular benefits for the ‘middle class’ 
of choice in public services. Blomqvist, argues in the case of Sweden, that the 
middle class has a distinct preference for consumer choice (2004) and has a 
strong influence on policy choices. This influential group not only demands 
better services but crucially has a tendency to exit the public system if quality 
becomes an issue (Costa-Font and Jofre-Bonet 2008).  
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The potential bias towards the middle class in choice policies has led to equity 
concerns, despite the fact that choice is frequently positioned as a policy that 
benefits everyone, regardless of income and education. According to Fotaki 
(2009) the ability of the middle class to make ‘better choices’ and hence benefit 
disproportionately, depends on several factors. Dixon argues that the ability 
to make use of the choices relies on capabilities such as knowledge of the 
system and ability to communicate effectively, as well as socio-economic 
factors such as funds to cover additional travelling (2003). Finally, social 
context can explain why individuals in similar groups assimilate into certain 
behaviours and to make active and ‘good’ choices (Bourdieu 2008).  
 
3. Methods and data 
The middle class preference hypothesis is empirically analysed using the 
World Health Survey (2002) and the Eurobarometer 72.2 Survey (2009). These 
datasets offer a rich set of variables, including individuals’ perceptions of the 
national health care system, the demand for choice as well as demographic 
and satisfaction variables.  
 
This paper uses survey data from eight European countries; which reflects a 
broad representation of health care systems in Europe. We compare a sample 
of four SHI system countries (Belgium, France, Germany and The 
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Netherlands) and four NHS countries (UK, Spain, Italy and Sweden). The 
countries differ in the size of the health system, the extent of patient cost-
sharing, funding and territorial organisation. Importantly, in SHI countries, 
patient choice is embedded in the institutional setting of the health system 
whereas in NHS type countries choice is a more recent addition. Table 1 
outlines the key features of the health care systems in our sample. The SHI 
countries  spend more overall on health (as a proportion of GDP) tend to have 
a lower public expenditure compared to NHS type countries.  Out-of-pocket 
payments and the role for private insurance vary significantly between the 
countries, with a higher (yet variable) prevalence of private insurance in SHI 
countries. Co-payments (or out-of-pocket payments) tend to be driven by 
spending on pharmaceuticals, dentistry and physiotherapy and reflect 
attempts to counter rising expenditure.  
 
Our empirical strategy takes advantage of both within and between cross 
country variability. We firstly use the World Health Survey (WHS) (2002) to 
consider differences in how choice is perceived between countries and the 
relationship between the availability of choice and individual satisfaction 
with the health system. Table 2 illustrates the pattern of perceived freedom to 
choose between hospital and between care providers of all types – including 
general practitioners, where the most extensive choice is available – for each 
of the countries. There is substantial variation in the average ratings of the 
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perceived availability of choice between the countries, and the variation 
matches well the extent to which choice is available within each health care 
system, with Belgium in the top for both choice of hospital and choice of 
provider.  
 
We base our further analysis, on preferences for choice, using the 
Eurobarometer 72.2 Survey (2009), on the assumption that individuals’ 
perception of choice corresponds to the actual prevalence of choice, and this 
seems to be supported by the descriptive WHS data in table 2.1 The 
Eurobarometer 72.2, Survey (2009) offers data on preferences regarding the 
health care system in general, as well as preferences specifically related to 
individuals’ demand for choice when compared to other features of the health 
care system. The Eurobarometer Survey asks individuals what they consider 
to be the three most important criteria for quality health care from twelve 
criteria, including an option for ‘other’ (see table 3). The most commonly 
mentioned characteristics across the countries are ‘well-trained staff’, 
‘effective treatment’ and ‘no waiting lists’ (mentioned by up to 65% of 
respondents). These are known to be components which individuals see as 
important or indeed necessary for a positive health outcome (Johannesson et 
al. 1998; Dawson et al. 2007). Choice of doctor or hospital is mentioned by on 
                                                        
1 The perception of the availability of choice does not only depend on institutional features, but 
can also be affected by for example on geographical factors such as population density, and the 
organisation of specialist provider units.  
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average of 20% of respondents and varies across the country clusters; it is 
most common in Italy and least common in the UK. We identify middle class 
respondents using a range of social status indicators including income, 
education and employment status. Principally, a self-rated social status (‘1’ 
lowest and 10 ‘highest’) variable is used as it incorporates national relative 
conceptions of social class and this reduces the need to equivalise the scale to 
account for cross-country differences (Banerjee and Duflo 2008).  
 
The binary and ordinal dependent variables (health system satisfaction in the 
WHS and preferences in the Eurobarometer survey) are modelled using 
logistic models (Agresti 2012).2 The regression analysis of both datasets 
included a set of standard demographic covariates: age, gender, marital 
status, health variables (need, previous usage), employment, education and 
proxies for income. The models, reported in reduced form in table 4 and 5 are 
fully adjusted for these covariates. The full tables are available from the 
authors on request.  
 
 
                                                        
2 The logit regressions assume a latent variable y* which is linearly related to the observed 
independent variables 𝑦 ∗= 𝑥𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 where 𝑥𝑖  is a vector of observed covariates and 𝜀𝑖 is a random 
disturbance independent of the observed covariates. The observed dependent variable y equals 1 
only if an unobserved variable y* is greater than an unobserved threshold, 𝜏.  
That is 𝑦𝑖 =
1 𝑖𝑓𝑦𝑖
∗ > 𝜏
0 𝑖𝑓 𝑦𝑖
∗ ≤  𝜏
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4. Results   
Firstly, we examined the effect of individual’s rating of choice on the overall 
satisfaction using the WHS dataset. The ordered logit models reported in 
table 4 explores whether choice is a valued dimension in individuals 
satisfaction with the national health system. The specifications include a set of 
variables capturing demographic and socio-economic characteristics as well 
as indicators for previous interaction with the health service. Country 
dummies are added to the standard set of covariates and in this we aim to 
isolate the effect of the level of available choice on satisfaction with the health 
care system. The key variable of interest; ‘rating of choice’ is positive and 
significant across the specifications. Ordered logit odds ratios are reported, 
implying that when, for example, comparing the ‘very bad’ rating of choice to 
the ‘very good’ rating, the odds that the cases are found in a higher 
(compared to any lower) category of satisfaction with the health care system 
is 6.348 times larger for NHS countries. The results are overall consistent with 
expectations and suggest that availability of choice is at least implicitly a 
component relevant for satisfaction with the national health system.  
 
Age exhibits a positive effect in explaining satisfaction while the results 
indicate that less educated are more satisfied with the health care system. 
Particularly noteworthy is that people in lower income quartiles are more 
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satisfied compared to the highest income quartile once we control for 
previous interaction with the health care system. The analysis was repeated 
on country samples which revealed that the positive effect of choice on 
satisfaction ratings is significant in all country samples except for Belgium3. 
Generally people with lower incomes rate the health care system higher, 
except in Sweden where income quartiles 1-3 rate the system lower than 
quartile 4. We find that only in Belgium, France, Sweden and the UK income 
exhibits significant differences.   
 
 
Overall, the World Health Survey data indicates that choice ratings exert a 
positive effect on satisfaction with the health care system. This means that, 
across our sample, choice is a significant component to the views on the 
health care system, regardless of reform trajectory. Previous literature has 
identified individuals’ satisfaction with the health care system as a key 
indicator of the responsiveness of the system (Coulter and Jenkinson 2005) 
and a proxy for the legitimacy of the health care system (Bergman 2002).   
 
Next, in order to explore the preferences for choice as a function of social class 
and in relation to reform trajectory we use regression analysis of the 
Eurobarometer 72.2 data (2009). Our dependent variables, mentioning choice 
                                                        
3 The insignificance of the Belgian sample is not surprising considering the institutional structure 
and reform trajectory. Private options and increased choice were implemented responding to 
demands stemming from the slow inclusion of cutting edge technology and medicines under the 
universal health insurance (Schokkaert & Voorde 2005). 
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of hospital and of doctor as features of a quality health care system (see table 
3), are taken as indicators of demand for choice while the key independent 
variable ‘self-rated social status’ captures the effect of individuals’ socio-
economic group. Table 5 separates the two samples, NHS (Italy, UK, Spain 
and Sweden) from SHI countries (France, Belgium, Netherlands and 
Germany). We find that social status has a positive effect on both the 
dependent variables; choice of hospital and choice of GP, significant at the 1% 
level in the NHS group. A one unit increase in the social status rating 
increases the odds of mentioning choice of GP as a criterion for a quality 
health care system (i.e. going from 0-1) by 1.147. Similarly, for choice of 
hospital, the effect size is 1.153. In the SHI country group on the other hand, 
the demand for choice of doctor was negatively related to self-rated social 
status while the demand for choice of hospital was unrelated to social status. 
The ordinal self-rated social status variable (ranging from 1 to 10) was also 
entered as individual dummies for each of the categories, and as quartiles 
which indicated that the strongest effect was found in the third quartile in 
NHS countries. 
 
The health system related variables, included in all specifications in table 5, 
explain some of the variation while socio-demographic variables are overall 
insignificant or weakly significantly related to the health system 
characteristics. Interestingly, the overall rating of the health system, 
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comparing ‘very good’ to ‘fairly good’ is positive for NHS systems and 
negative in SHI countries. Lower satisfaction seems to lead to more desire for 
choice, but only in NHS countries, indicating that choice may be seen as a 
solution to quality issues. Gender is generally insignificant, although men in 
NHS countries are more likely to mention choice of doctor. Similarly for age, 
occupational status and marital status, small effects are found. In summary, 
demand for choice on average is weaker in NHS countries, however more 
likely to be located in groups of respondents which can be defined as middle 
class.  
 
5. Discussion  
The empirical analysis provided evidence supporting the idea of the middle 
class as a group which views choice as an important facet of a quality health 
care system. The middle class may prefer choice both for intrinsic reasons, i.e. 
they ‘like’ to have control and autonomy (Iyengar 2010) and it may form an 
integral part of middle class identity as suggested by Bourdieu (2008). On the 
other hand, the availability of choice may be viewed as a tool for assessing a 
quality service, which is more responsive to individual preferences and needs. 
There may be an overlap with political ideology, in which choice and the 
associated competition between providers is seen as an important system 
wide tool for improved efficiency and quality. What we mean by this, is that 
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in relation to other motivations for provider choice reform in European health 
systems, including efficiency and quality and consumer responsiveness, these 
may constitute reasons for the identified middle class demands for choice.   
 
The reform trajectories in the European countries we analysed allowed us to 
contrast various ‘levels’ of availability of choice as institutionalised in the 
system. We found a strong association between the availability of choice and 
individual satisfaction with the health care system. This relationship may not 
be causal, and importantly, when we distinguish by health system type, we 
only find such an association among middle range income groups within tax-
funded NHS systems. This implies that demands for provider choice tend to 
be higher when the institutional default offers less choice. A caveat worth 
noting is that, although our data supports a relationship between the 
perceived levels of choice and actual levels of choice, this relationship has not 
always been seen in other studies. For example, in the UK, surveys have 
found that only around half of patients surveyed in 2010 recall being offered a 
choice of hospital (Dixon, 2010).  
 
One implication of our results is that satisfying the middle class preference for 
choice can be a way for tax-funded health care systems to maintain support 
from this key group. In progressive tax systems, the middle class subsidise 
the disproportionate use of health care by individuals in more deprived 
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income groups (Goodin & Le Grand 1987). If perceived quality is low, beyond 
the threshold pushing middle class patients to opt for self-funded private care 
or private insurance, the public system risks losing support from this key 
constituency (Costa-Font and Jofre-Bonet, 2008). Hence, we argue that choice 
of provider is valuable in that it allows middle class users, who value having 
a choice, choose a service of high enough quality to remain in the public 
system. Consequently, instead of being a risk factor for increased 
privatisation and weakening of public welfare, we argue that choice can 
instead be a factor that might serve to maintain middle class use of publicly-
funded services and strengthen the role of the public health system. 
Nonetheless it should be noted that private providers, funded through the 
public system, are not likely to be affected by this process, and the role for 
private providers within the public system may become more important 
where choice is a key feature.  
 
This results are consistent with our middle class hypothesis, namely that, 
given middle class preferences for choice, the offer of provider choice presents 
an institutional device to keep the middle class using the NHS, who otherwise 
might opt out to the private sector (Costa-Font and Jofre-Bonet, 2008). In 
contrast, in SHI countries, provider choice is integral to the health insurance 
system and is therefore not a reason to opt out. In line with this, Anell (2005) 
argues that the reason for the introduction of choice constitutes a political 
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strategy to attain the support of the middle class to wider reform proposals.  
At the same time, in some countries the introduction of provider choice is 
wrapped up with efforts to decentralise provision and funding of care. This 
reform strategy is also thought to lead to greater individual influence over the 
health service and hence part of the benefits of choice policies overlap with 
those of these other modes of decentralised public provision (López-Casanovas,  et 
al  2006)(.Finally, one must acknowledge that the provider e choice agenda by 
providing the opportunities for public service legitimisation (Le Grand 2007), 
it can serve as a ‘means to and end’ of reforming public services.  
 
Our empirical results suggest that there is a correlation (not causal 
association)  between middle class preferences for choice and the institutional 
structures in NHS health care systems. We can hence not, based on the 
present data, claim that the middle class is a direct driver of reforms. Instead, 
we argue that, as in most countries, improvement of the health care system is 
perceived as an electoral asset and expanding provider choice increases the 
chance of obtaining the support of the middle class, this presents an 
opportunity for political incumbents to claim credit for health policy reform. 
Electoral politics and the drive for (re-)election is not the only dynamic behind 
the transfer of preferences into policy; public opinion also influences the 
behaviour of politicians already elected (Page and Shapiro 1983). Narud and 
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Esaiasson discuss this facet as ‘between elections democracy’, emphasising 
the importance of voter input also outside of elections (2013).  
6. Conclusion 
Political motivations of the ‘choice agenda’ in European health care systems – 
beyond the discussions around quality and efficiency – are both  largely 
under-researched, and of primary strategic importance. In this paper we 
provide some evidence consistent with the hypothesis that  ‘choice reforms’ 
are associated with the demands for health care service improvement by e 
middle classes in NHS countries. This finding is consistent with Le Grand 
(2007) and others’ discussion of choice as a middle class concern. Indeed, 
provider choice appears to be an institutional device to keep the middle class 
using (and hence supporting) the health system. We can conclude that 
political motivations aimed at keeping the support for the public health 
system in Europe are central to understanding the introduction of choice 
reforms, their benefits and challenges.  Future  research need to understand 
better how the median class impact of the expansion of NHS services  and in 
keeping the middle classes in the system rather than opting out to using 
private health insurance.  
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Table 1: Institutional features influencing choice and competition in eight European 
health care systems (2008) 
  
Financing 
structure 
Expenditu
re 
Co-
payment
s 
General 
governme
nt 
expenditu
re 
Private 
expenditu
re 
Spending on 
pharmaceutic
als  
  
% of GDP % of total expenditure on health  
So
ci
al
 h
ea
lt
h
 
in
su
ra
n
ce
 Belgium 
Sickness 
funds 
11.1 20.5 10.5 25.3 16.3 
France 
Sickness 
funds 
11.2 7.4 5.2 22.2 16.5 
Germany 
Sickness 
funds 
10.5 13.0 8.8 23.2 15.1 
Netherlands 
Sickness 
funds 
9.9 5.7 5.1 16.5 11.5 (1) 
N
at
io
n
al
 h
ea
lt
h
 s
er
v
ic
e 
Italy 
Tax based 
centralised 
9.1 19.5 77.1 22.8 19.3 
Spain 
Tax based 
centralised 
9.0 20.7 67.7 27.5 21.0 
Sweden 
Tax based 
decentralis
ed 
9.4 15.6 81.9 18.1 13.4 
UK 
Tax based 
centralised 
8.7 11.1 82.6 17.4 12.2 
Source: OECD Health Data 2010 Version: October 2010. Data from 2008  
Notes: Private expenditure includes out-of-pocket payments, private insurance programmes, 
charities and occupational health care. General government expenditure is incurred by central, 
state/regional and local government authorities, excluding social security schemes, including are 
non-market, non-profit institutions that are controlled and mainly financed by government units. 
Co-payments comprise cost-sharing, self-medication and other expenditure paid directly by 
private households including co-payment or co-insurance or deductibles. Public expenditure 
includes expenditure incurred by state, regional and local government and social security 
schemes.  
 
 
Table 2: Mean rating of freedom to choose in 2005, by country 
 
Choice of 
hospital SE 
Choice of 
provider SE 
 
Satisfaction with 
health care system SE 
Belgium 4.195 0.04 4.514 0.048 4.304 0.027 
France 3.904 0.035 4.468 0.068 4.104 0.029 
Germany 3.294 0.039 4.229 0.063 3.595 0.032 
Netherlands 3.784 0.027 3.931 0.052 3.196 0.031 
Italy 3.608 0.04 3.808 0.071 3.849 0.036 
28 
 
Spain 3.231 0.018 3.546 0.024 3.554 0.012 
Sweden 3.268 0.079 3.622 0.076 3.811 0.036 
UK 3.75 0.053 4.037 0.059 3.882 0.034 
Source: Authors calculation based on World health survey (2002). Survey questions on choice of 
hospital (Q7428) and provider (Q7325) on a scale from: (1) Very bad to (5) Very good. 
Satisfaction with health care system (Q7021) on a scale from: (1) Very dissatisfied to (5) Very 
satisfied.  
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Table 3: Percentage mentioning criteria for a quality health system, by country in 2009 
Source: Eurobarometer 72.2 2009 
  
 
Belgiu
m 
Franc
e 
German
y 
Netherland
s Italy Spain 
Swede
n UK Total 
Well-
trained 
staff 
50.94 47 62.65 63.42 
43.1
7 
54.2
8 
65.77 
59.8
7 
56.2
5 
Effective 
treatment 
32.91 34.71 39.62 39.36 
36.2
5 
28.3
9 
35.32 
40.0
4 
36.0
7 
No 
waiting 
lists 
19.01 21.53 13.79 37.87 
33.3
7 
46.3
1 
39.3 
27.4
3 
28.8
2 
Choice of 
doctor 
27.29 23.6 25.11 32.21 
36.7
3 
22.8
1 
27.56 
21.1
7 
26.9
5 
Proximity 20.99 40.81 15.22 21.37 
11.8
3 
28.3
9 
56.02 
13.7
6 
25.2
9 
Modern 
equipmen
t 
26.4 30.29 31.69 16 
21.8
3 
20.3
2 
24.38 
23.3
9 
24.7
4 
Dignity 33.89 24.58 27.46 21.37 
15.8
7 
23.0
1 
14.63 
12.4
2 
21.9
7 
Safety 
from 
harm 
17.34 15.14 34.55 22.76 
22.8
8 
18.2
3 
4.48 
29.1
6 
21.4
6 
Clean 13 19.27 22.19 12.92 19.9 
11.8
5 
10.65 
29.8
4 
17.8 
Choice of 
hospital 
26.11 20.26 14.25 14.81 12.5 
10.3
6 
8.26 
14.0
5 
15.0
3 
Friendly 
staff 
11.13 8.06 1.89 4.47 10 3.98 4.78 6.64 6.12 
Don't 
know 
0.39 0.39 0.2 0.7 1.35 0.6 0.2 2.98 0.82 
Other 0.89 0.1 0.46 0.99 0.58 1.99 0.6 0.1 0.69 
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Table 4: Satisfaction with health care, Ordered Logit Regression using World Health 
Survey 2005 
 
Dependent variable: Satisfaction with the  health care system 
     
 
 Health variables  NHS SHI 
Freedom to choose health 
care provider 
 Very Bad (1) (ref cat)     
 Bad  2.064*** 2.005*** 7.993* 
 Moderate  2.990*** 3.051*** 4.679 
 
 Good  4.149*** 4.299*** 6.893** 
   Very good  (5) 6.028*** 6.348*** 9.167** 
Respondent’s spending on health care  0.927*** 0.501 0.945*** 
Respondent’s spending on health insurance 0.930 0.962 0.893 
Respondent had previous hospital stay 0.922*** 0.979 0.900 
Country Belgium 9.682***   3.614*** 
 
France 5.019*** 
 
1.462*** 
 
Germany 1.416*** 
 
0.747*** 
 
Italy 1.018 1.061*** 
 
 
Netherlands 2.522*** 
  
 
Sweden 2.647*** 2.764*** 
 
 
UK 3.201*** 3.293*** 
   Spain (ref cat)       
Cut 1 
 
-1.078 -0.852 -1.396 
Cut 2 
 
0.170 0.353 0.113 
Cut 3 
 
1.653 1.999 0.749 
Cut 4 
 
4.038 4.431 3.098 
Number of observations   3629 3017 612 
Pseudo R-square 0.0554 0.059 0.040 
 
Note: * Significant at 10% level; ** Significant at 5%, *** Significant at 1%. Standard errors are 
clustered at country level.  
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Table 5: Demand for choice in NHS versus SHI countries, logistic regressions on Eurobarometer 
72.2 
Dependent 
variables:  
 
Choice of 
doctor 
Choice of 
doctor 
Choice of 
hospital 
Choice of 
hospital 
  
NHS SHI NHS SHI 
Self-rated social status 1.147*** 0.911** 1.153*** 1.028 
Overall health care 
quality 
Very good         
Fairly good 1.251*** 0.841*** 1.060 0.911 
Fairly bad 1.130 0.850 0.935 1.083 
  Very bad 0.881 0.553 0.843 1.145 
Experience with health care system 0.785** 1.012 0.814* 0.994 
Hospital care: 
probability of harm 
Very likely         
Fairly likely 0.881 1.196 0.795 1.142 
Not very likely 0.7045* 1.091 0.742 1.045 
  Not at all likely 0.660 0.968 0.594 1.494* 
Area type Large town 1.314** 1.324*** 0.931 1.149 
 
Mid-sized town 1.171 1.059 0.936 0.875 
  Rural         
Italy       1.210   0.820   
Spain 
 
2.128*** 
 
0.708** 
 
Sweden 
 
1.370** 
 
0.590*** 
 
UK           
France 
  
0.616*** 
 
0.706*** 
Germany 
  
0.714*** 
 
0.427*** 
Netherlands 
  
0.546*** 
 
0.510*** 
Belgium 
     
Number of observations 3760 4359 3760 4359 
R-square   0.0171 0.0308 0.0317 0.0216 
  
Note: * Significant at 10% level; ** Significant at 5%, *** Significant at 1%. Standard errors are 
clustered on countries. 
 
